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Abstract
Skepticism is one of the oldest epistemological positions. Since the time of the Greeks,
philosophers have been asking the question of is any knowledge possible. The Ancient skeptics
of the time doubted everything while David Hume was skeptical of only some things. He further
recognized that a global view was not viable for daily life. I argue in this paper that we should
follow Hume’s approach in adopting a skepticism that begins with doubt and then examines the
evidence for claims before coming to a conclusion. This will be markedly different from a priori
assumptions of no knowledge which will be fleshed out throughout the course of the paper. The
body of the paper will include history of figures in skepticism, and then present the view I am
arguing for. In the final section I address some objections and give some rebuttals in hopes of
solidifying my view.

I.

Introduction
Skepticism is one of the most ancient epistemological positions. The basic statement “I

doubt that is the case” can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. Most of us have heard the
statement that their skeptical of Claim X or Y. What exactly is the thought process that leads one
to doubt that something is true? Is there a limit of things that is reasonable to doubt? Is a global
skepticism philosophically tenable? Can one be a skeptic and yet hold beliefs that they act on?
All of these questions will be dealt with in some detail. Special emphasis will be placed
on the role skepticism plays in the mind of the rational thinker. I happen to think that to be a
fully rational thinker, a tincture of skepticism is not only recommended, but mandatory. The
challenge now is to sketch out what sort of skepticism that is. I will begin by presenting the
philosophers who have advocated different shades of skepticism in their writing. I present this
not as an exhaustive history, I could not do justice to the thinkers, but to attempt to see where the
battle-lines are in the discussion.
II.

History of Skeptical Thought
The Ancients: Global Skepticism
Skepticism as an epistemological position dates back to the ancient Greek philosopher

Pyrrho. Similar to Socrates, he wrote nothing down and all of what we know of him is due to the
writings of his followers. As with most anyone with little or no writing of their own,
controversies abound. What is known is that he lived from around 360 B.C.E to 270 B.C.E.
Pyrrho, along with other philosophers most notably Anaxarchus of Abdera, accompanied
Alexander the Great to India (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy , 2010). It was here that
Pyrrho formulated the doctrine known as Pyrrhonism.

Pyrrho was a global skeptic in the sense that he thought that no knowledge was possible.
Central to this view is that any outcome is as likely as any other. Bertrand Russell recounts an
amusing anecdote of Pyrrho walking down the street and seeing his mentor with his head stuck
in the ditch. Pyrrho came to the conclusion that he had no good reason to believe that his mentor
would be better off with his head out of the ditch and thus left him there.
I want to emphasize here that for the Pyrrhonian, global skepticism often means acting in
accordance with the claim that no knowledge is possible. Pyrrho thought that knowledge claims
could never be justified, so even mundane ideas, for example, that you should not jump out of
the window because you will fall and die come under close to scrutiny. Pyrrhonian skepticism
commits us to the view that all we have is custom. A sort of “Do as the Romans do” ethic is the
best way to save us from error.
When I refer to custom, I just mean the day to day activities of a society. A simple
example is taking bread off the plate versus eating the plate itself. A Pyrrhonian would simply
follow the custom of eating the bread rather than the plate. A skeptic of this sort would still hold
to the idea that there is no good reason to think that the plate could not nourish. This idea goes
back to the claim made by the Pyrrhonain that any outcome is as likely as another.
David Hume “The Mitigated Skeptic”
David Hume was bom 1711 in Edinburg, Scotland. Little is known about his early
education, but he did enroll in the University of Edinburgh where he graduated without a degree.
After flirting with a career in law, Hume gravitated toward philosophy, which would be his life’s
work. He lays out his thoughts on skepticism in a work entitled An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding. This work is actually a toned down version of The Treatise o f Human Nature
which was so controversial that Hume edited it down to make it more palatable.

The last part of the Enquiry has Hume laying out a different kind of skepticism then his
Pyrrohnian forbearers. He distinguishes between two kinds of skepticism, one extreme and the
other moderate. Think of the former as Pyrrohnian global skepticism and the other as mitigated
skepticism. Hume mentions Descartes as attempting to make plausible the first kind. Hume
points out that the problem with the extreme kind is that it is unworkable. Hume writes, “The
CARTESIAN doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it
plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of
assurance and conviction upon any subject”(Hume 109).
Hume contends that a more moderate form of this is necessary for the study of philosophy, as it
helps us wean ourselves from preconceived opinions and notions. The sort of skepticism that is
presented in this work can be exemplified with this quote from Hume, “Another species of
mitigated skepticism, which may be of advantage to mankind, is the limitation of our enquiries to
such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.” (Hume 112)
We will see later that natural science is the tool that is used for this sort of endeavor. Hume
ends the Enquiry stating that we should set to flames works of divinity or “school metaphysics”
which work by appealing to things outside of our own understanding.

III.

Mitigated Skepticism Explained

So what exactly is mitigated skepticism? In philosophical parlance, a mitigated skepticism is
one where you doubt certain kinds of knowledge. For Hume, these were epistemic claims
concerning causation, the existence of the self, and the existence of God. For others, a mitigated
skepticism includes doubting government reports concerning 9/11. Which kind of skepticism is

justified? Is there anything we can add that will solidify ourselves against the threat of having a
wrong opinion or belief?
A working definition of mitigated skepticism is one where claims are doubtable only if the
evidence for said claim is lacking. Now, what I mean by evidence will be defined at a later time,
but for now consider a claim such as the efficacy of vaccines. There have been numerous studies
and years of testing and practice that show that vaccines serve the purpose of immunizing
children against infectious diseases. Vaccines save countless lives and, for the most part, are not
harmful. To doubt the efficacy of vaccines given these circumstances is foolhardy to say the
least. How do you separate good evidence from bad evidence? Carl Sagan offers some
suggestions from his important work Demon Haunted World.
Sagan presents what he refers to as his “baloney-detection kit”. Sagan writes, “The
question is not whether we like the conclusion that emerges out of a train of reasoning, but
whether the conclusion follows from the premise or starting point and whether that premise is
true” (Sagan 210).
Sagan presents some tools that I will paraphrase in brief. Among these are: To know
anything we need independent replication of “facts”. Person A repeating his own study isn’t
enough to prove that A’s phenomenon is real. We need Person B and even C to replicate the
findings to say definitely that an effect is real. The news media is repeatedly making this mistake
when reporting on studies that are done in academia. A study that fits the narrative a particular
outlet wishes to present is often gets big headlines before other scientists have an opportunity to
replicate the findings.
A rough summation of “facts” would mean data gleaned from a proper application of the
scientific method. This means double blinded studies, control groups and peer review. These are

the best tools for separating good science from bad science. The evidence and facts I am
referring to flow from the proper use of the scientific method. Failure to understand how science
works is but one mistake people often make when evaluating the truth of a claim.
Do not get overly attached to a view just because you hold it. I refer to this as the “tunnel
vision” problem in our reasoning from day to day. For instance, someone who believes that
climate change is fraudulent is unlikely to entertain the evidence from the climate scientists who
think the phenomenon is real. Moreover, they often resort to ad-hominem attacks to make their
point rather than debating the evidence that the other side is presenting.
The view presented here should be understood as not articulating what we should think,
but rather how we should think. There’s no guarantee that we will all arrive at the same
conclusion even if we employed each tool perfectly. Think of those who take on the skeptical
label. Climate skeptics, evolution skeptics, skeptics about the moon landing, the flat-earth
society, homeopaths (those skeptical about the efficacy about the effect of modem medicine) all
present views that hold doubt as the center piece of their position. In an attempt to further clarify
this view of mitigated skepticism, I will take up an interesting question that most probably do not
consider. Is there a limit on what one can doubt? Before we get into those questions, an
articulation of the relationship between science and this sort of skepticism is appropriate and we
turn to that now.
IV.

Science and Rational Skepticism: The Unbreakable Link
Philosophy has some interesting things to tell us about the role of science in our lives.

Bertrand Russell for example thought that science was a tool to help us understand the reality in
which we inhabit (Russell, 1993). Karl Popper attempted to differentiate between science and

non-science, a very important issue for the skeptic. How exactly does science assist in the
process of skeptical thinking?
Science provides an empirical basis for testable claims. Now, this means that claims such
as the existence of ghosts are outside of the realm of science. Prayer, on the other hand, is a
testable claim because you can measure the efficacy of it by praying for some people and not
praying for others and measure the difference in outcome. More examples of empirical claims
involve climate change, evolution, and the efficacy of pharmaceutical drugs. An important
question to take up is does science provide knowledge in an epistemic sense? Before I provide an
example, we will need to contrast two different types of knowledge that of “strong” and “weak”
knowledge.
To know something in the “strong” sense means that it would be an absurdity to doubt it.
Descartes’s “Cogito” provides an example of such a knowledge claim. The reasoning goes that
for the evil genius to feed Descartes illusions, there has to be a Descartes for the genius to
follow, hence the popularly quoted “I think therefore I am”. Another example of strong
knowledge claims involves so-called commonsense propositions. Arguments such as GE
Moore’s “Here is a hand” argument says that it would be unreasonable to doubt that there is an
external world outside of your mind.
“Weak” knowledge claims are those that can be reversed given new evidence. Most
claims we deal with on a daily basis are of these sort. “I think my car will work today”. “I think I
will wake up tomorrow”. These are all based on past experience and evidence. These sort of
inductive inferences pervade most of our daily lives. Some scientific claims are true in a weak
sense. The theory of gravity is true, but tomorrow we could wake up and be floating. With these
distinctions in mind, let us try to answer the question does science give us knowledge?

Suppose you claim you know that the theory of evolution is true. Do you have a justified
true belief? I would say not and this is because science does not usually tell us what is true, but
rather gives us the best models based on the best available evidence at the time. Scientific
theories are first and foremost falsifiable, that is could be shown to be false at any time. So,
scientific claims are not knowable in the “strong” sense as they can be shown to be false.
Scientific claims fall within the “weak” conjectural realm of knowledge. It falls short of
the gold standard, but winds up being pretty effective. Vaccine efficacy has been tested for some
hundred years and has been shown time and time again to do the job of protecting children
against infectious diseases. However, evidence could build up over time that vaccines have a
harmful effect that doctors have not accounted for. Science that has worked for generations could
change overnight. This fact of the method means that science can only be true in a “weak” sense,
true given the evidence available at the time.
V.

Moving From Doubt To Belief
Pseudoscience and superstition are prominent in our society for one reason. These things

provide comfort and allow some to deal with the world they inhabit. The problem is that there
does not appear to be any good reason to believe in superstition or magic. This brings me to
another principle of skeptical thought: you want to believe as many true things as possible while
disregarding as many false things as possible. What sort of method do we need to move from
disbelieving something to believing something?
Firstly, we can examine the claim itself. Suppose Bobby tells you he bought a dog. You
know Bobby to be a trustworthy person who does not appear to ever exaggerate or stretch the
truth. Here we can safely just take Bobby’s word for it. Suppose though Bobby told you he
bought a pet dragon. Bobby could be the most trustworthy person on the planet, you would need

to either see the dragon or have evidence of its existence before you could believe such a claim.
The point here is that one should level scrutiny based on the claim presented. Mundane claims
usually require little beyond an individual’s word if you know the person to be honest. However,
claims in science or claims about paranormal events require much more in the way of evidence.
Eben Alexander is a member of a long list of people claiming that they have gone to
heaven only to return to tell the tale. What is interesting about story is that Mr. Alexander does
not pastor a church, but was a practicing neurologist, a supposed man of science. His story has
been debunked (Zuckerman, 2013), but I want to focus on one particular aspect of the account,
which is the claim itself. Suppose someone tells you they have had some experience. In
Alexander’s case, he claimed he went to heaven after a traumatic experience. Is his testimony
sufficient for someone else to move from doubt to belief?
Personal experiences are necessarily first person, so the answer here is clearly no. If I see
a ghost, that may be sufficient for me to believe it. However that is not sufficient for anyone else
to believe. I could have been mistaken or have hallucinated. I could be lying to you or conflated
a dream with reality. The mind is incredibly fallible; we make mistakes all the time, so it would
not be prudent to believe someone else’s account of something even if you knew them to be
incredibly trustworthy.
The fact that the mind is incredibly fallible should make us skeptical of our own personal
experiences in general. Accounts abound of dead loved ones appearing in the bedrooms of their
spouses. Angels and alien abductions are all anchored in the power of personal experience. The
problem again is the mind is fallible, so even the person having the experience should be wary
and seek independent confirmation before claiming what they saw was real.

This follows doubly for eye-witness testimony. For example, 30,000-100,000 claimed to
see the sun dance at a holy shrine in Portugal in 1917. Surely, tens of thousands of people
couldn’t be incorrect about such an event. Perhaps not, as there is a simpler explanation of what
occurred on that day. The people gathered because they expected to see a miracle, retinal
distortion from searching the sky provides a better explanation of the phenomenon. You combine
this with the fact that not everyone claimed to see the sun dance and you have adequate room to
doubt the account. Group hysteria and delusions are also common which can account for such an
event.
Eye-witness testimony therefore is not the sole decider in the validity of a claim. In fact,
one could argue that it should not come into play at all. What does work is independent
verification of data that remains falsifiable. Whether we are dealing in medicine or the
paranormal, this remains our best chance of avoiding error and falsities.

VI.

Critical Thinking: Deconstructing Odd Claims
Imagine you are the parent of someone going through a supposed paranormal experience

like demonic possession. Psychotropic drugs and therapy are not appearing to work, so you turn
to magic and the paranormal. The question we face is was that a justified leap? Well, only if
we’ve ruled out all natural causes. Imagine you are sitting at a table and the person across from
you falls into an epileptic fit. She’s convulsing and foaming at the mouth and you rightly take her
to the emergency room where she undergoes extensive neurological testing. Suppose they find
nothing wrong with her brain.
Imagine further that all subsequent tests come back negative. There does not appear to be
an explanation for her seizures. Does the inability to give a scientific explanation justify a

supernatural one? No, refer back to our first skeptical tool. We need independent replication of
facts before we can make a statement about anyone particular phenomenon. If our friend in this
example is truly possessed by a demon or a ghost, there should be a method of ascertaining the
truth of that, which does not rely on faith.
At the risk of exhausting the point, allow me another example.Suppose we’re
investigating a murder and we have two suspects, Billy and Todd. We exonerate Billy of all
charges, does it follow that we indict Todd? No, because the evidence of Todd’s guilt is wholly
independent of Billy. Much like the seizure example, we need independent verification before
we can make a claim about what it is. Supernatural claims need a positive case that does not
result from a failing in a naturalistic one.
Claims made by religious adherents are in some ways easier to rid ourselves of than say a
claim made by a doctor. Andrew Wakefield published a study in 1998 that linked the MMR
vaccine with autism. (Godlee, 2011) The results were pretty striking. Vaccine rates dropped to
just 80% in 2003-2004, which is well below the 98% rate set by the WHO. Such a claim, if true,
would shake the foundations of the way disease is treated in America.
Sagan’s tools will prove instructive once again. One study is not sufficient to change a
working paradigm within the scientific community. With the Wakefield case, no one was able to
replicate his study. Moreover, the co-authors of his work retracted their support even as
Wakefield refused to. The study had other issues as well such as not being controlled or worse
than that relying on parental memory and testimony.
The beauty of science is that no matter one’s own opinion or bias, with correct trials and
experiments, we can come to the actual effect any drug has on the body. In the Wakefield case,
the failure to replicate should have been the first red flag. The damage he did to the movement to

vaccinate children is still being repaired as of this writing. Any scientist in the field should be
wise enough to not overstate the effect of one study. Alas, Mr. Wakefield is not the only
physician who fails to adequately support his conclusions.
Multiple Sclerosis is an auto-immune disease with no cure. It affects the brain and central
nervous system by eating away at the myelin, which is the protective coating of the nerves. It is
not currently clear what causes the disease, but there are some hypothesis’s that include Vitamin
D deficiency, environment and genetic components. Research has advanced and new drugs
arrive on the market every day that help the newly diagnosed.
Paulo Zamboni is a neurologist from Italy who hypothesized that MS is caused by a
vascular problem known as chronic cerebrospinal venous insuffiency (CCSVI). The New York
Times quotes Zamboni as thinking, “Blocked veins prevent blood from draining from the head,
causing iron to back up in the brain and damage nerves that send signals to the body” (Tullis,
2012) One important note is that Zamboni’s interest was piqued by his wife’s diagnosis in 1995.
MS is incurable, but one can go many years without any noticeable problems. However,
once the disease begins to take effect, usually after around 10-20 years after diagnosis,
desperation often sets in. This unfortunate reality about MS makes it susceptible for snake-oil
salesmen and charlatans. Now, the fact that Zamboni published a conflicting paper doesn’t make
him a charlatan. One should however find a problem with the fact that Zamboni has patents with
a company that makes ultrasounds used to diagnosis CCSVI (Blackwell, 2011).
Even with the conflict of interest, it doesn’t follow that CCSVI is bunk. Here again we
have the problem of replication. There has been no independent verification that lack of blood
flow either causes MS or helps MS. People however have died from the so-called “liberation

procedure” and some that have survived the procedure have suffered nerve damage. Relapses of
MS occur often even after the procedure requiring some to have to return and undergo it again.
Patients should know better, but they can’t necessarily be faulted for trying anything to
help either themselves or a loved one. The Wakefield and Zamboni examples show that even
doctors make the same mistakes in reasoning layman do. Zamboni has unfortunately made the
same mistake Wakefield did. He became too attached to his hypothesis. Sagan shows us clearly
that this is a huge problem and once again we see how an inappropriate use of science is leading
to false hopes and even killing people.
VII.

Objections and Rebuttals

The section that follows is my attempt to entertain some objections to the mitigated
skepticism that I present. I will tackle claims from the global skeptic, the post-modernist, the
religious and even some conspiracy types. My aim is to suggest that skepticism of the sort I
present is necessary for someone to be rational and to live a life that is as free from error and
false belief as possible. Throughout this section, I will present an objection and the rebuttal will
follow soon after. We will begin with this question of why not be a global skeptic. To answer
this we will need to distinguish between Pyrrhonian and global skepticism.

Objections and Rebuttals
1. Why Not Be a Global Skeptic?
Our task now is to distinguish rational skepticism from the more radical forms. Recall that
global skepticism is the view that no knowledge is possible. Therefore, we should suspend
judgment about everything. We can distinguish global skepticism from the even more
extreme Pyrrohnian view. Global skepticism holds that no knowledge is possible because no

belief can be rationally justified. A common move is to ask someone to justify a belief by
appealing to another belief and then another belief until there is an infinite regress.
Pyrrho’s view centers on the idea that any outcome is as likely as any other. So, Pyrrho
likely thought that jumping out of a window could result in either going down or up. Is this
really a justified position? Yes and no, we must allow that it is logically possible that one
could jump out of a window and go up. However, I do think there is a sense that we can say
that we could be rationally justified in a belief that we will likely plummet to our death upon
leaping out of a window.
Suppose you drop one hundred pieces of paper out of the window one by one. You start
with the position that the paper will fall to the ground. Each subsequent paper that falls to the
ground only bolsters this giving you good reason to think that this condition holds. Moreover,
the law of gravity serves as a reason on top of the experiments that leads you to the view that
the proposition being explored is actually true. Here, based on our belief and further good
reasons, we can safely conclude that this condition is true, albeit in a weak sense.1
The global skeptic could counter with all of this is well and good, but I am not still
buying that this is a rationally justified belief. We need to define our terms of course and I
think “rationally justified” means something like the evidence available at the time leads to a
certain conclusion. We again have to cede the logical possibility that the paper can go up.
The position the mitigated skeptic takes here is that one can have a belief, a rationally
justified one, that jumping out of the window results in falling to your death. The opposite
belief is ultimately meaningless in the sense that it could never inform action. (Assuming one
cares about his continuing existence)
1 Hume on Induction makes it so a claim like this isn't knowable in the strong sense. Moreover, Hume would deny
that this knowable in any sense. This something that that will have to be set aside. Weak Knowledge is weak
because it can be reversed, so isn't really in defiance of Hume's view.

Informing action is an important factor for the mitigated skeptic. It may be true that the
plate may nourish me rather than the bread, but I would never eat the plate. A basic
understanding of anatomy would inform me that the glass would likely cause internal
damage. Moreover, there have been cases of humans consuming glass and doing irreparable
damage to themselves. This is sufficient to say that I can be rationally justified in taking the
bread and not eating the plate.
2. What about the Matrix? AKA How Do We Know We Are Not in a Simulation?
Rene Descartes with a method known as hyperbolic doubt was able to doubt even his
own body. Those that have read the work understood that Descartes himself admits that he has to
pretend in order to make this belief happen. For Descartes, this is where he employs the “evil
genius” who tricks him into thinking that he has a body. Descartes’s thought experiment is
illustrative in that it shows a limit on what one can reasonably doubt.
Before this is fleshed out a definition of reasonable is appropriate. Reasonable here
means that a rational person could be convinced of such a position. This is because the position
takes into account the proper evidence, philosophical arguments and counter arguments that may
be presented. An example of a reasonable doubt would be a scientific claim made by a single
scientist. An unreasonable doubt would be one that results in a logical contradiction. I could not
doubt the view that I cannot be in two places. This is because being in two places would break a
pivotal law of logic. It would be logically not possible. To really flesh out a reasonable doubt
versus an unreasonable doubt, I present a well-worn thought experiment as an example of a
reasonable doubt.
Imagine that you are a brain in a vat. This is a thought experiment where every human’s
brain is suspended in a clear fluid. Aliens prod the brain with electrical shocks which provides

the organ with experiences. Any one of your brains could be in this soup right now. It is
indistinguishable from reality. This seems like an odd concoction by some crazed philosopher
and perhaps it is, but it demonstrates something important. I could reasonably doubt the reality I
am presented with. It could be the case that I am a brain in a vat. It is logically possible. The
point for the mitigated skeptic to consider is does it matter?
I would argue that it does not matter if we are a brain in a vat. Until such time as the alien
cuts off the electricity or Morpheus shows up with the blue pill, my experience and view of
reality is unaffected. Make no mistake, brain in a vat type arguments are philosophically relevant
because essentially they point to the question of first order claims of knowledge or claims about
the external world itself. However, these questions are not relevant for the mitigated skeptic in
the sense that UFOs and homeopathy are. These beliefs actually do inform action and affect the
lives of others.
To sum up this section, epistemic claims are completely doubtable. I could be in a
simulation as in The Matrix. Aliens could be probing my brain and feeding me false experiences.
Let us suppose we are living in some elaborate illusion. What of claims made within that
illusion? For example, science has established pretty clearly that diseases are caused by tiny
microbes that invade the cells of living organisms. Can you doubt the germ theory of disease?
Before answering this question, I should probably address the question can a mitigated skeptic
know anything.
3. Can a Skeptic Know Anything?
Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is concerned with asking what it is to know
something. Without getting too in-depth, the gold standard for knowing something, call it
Claim P, usually goes like this:

S knows P iff
S believes P
P is true
S is justified in believing P
This is why knowledge in philosophy is often given the label “justified true belief’. So,
does say my belief in the theory of evolution qualify under this definition? The answer appears to
be yes at first glance. I do believe in evolution and have evidence for it. Is it in fact true though?
Does science tell us what’s true? It is helpful at this point to draw a distinction between different
types of knowing.
Is it possible for a rational skeptic to believe something and even claim to know that it is
true? Yes, and this is because there is two different types of knowing “that”. There is knowledge
in the weak sense such as the claim that the sun will rise tomorrow. While it is logically possible
the sun could fail to rise, the evidence of some billions of years leads to the conclusion that the
sun will likely rise tomorrow. This is sufficient basis for a conjectural sort of knowledge.
There is also a “strong” sense of the word know. The external world provides a good
example of this. Suppose you are in the street and you see a car barreling toward you. You move
out of the way and your skeptical friend asks you why? You reply that you know that cars are
solid and you would have been killed. Your friend inquires further about how you know that.
You reply that you have seen hundreds of cars and all of them have been solid and incredibly
heavy. Moreover, you have read countless stories of people being killed by cars.

4. Post-Modernist Critiques: Is Skepticism Too Stringent

Skepticism is a “bee in the bonnet” of Post-modern thinkers who believe that our current
modernist take on reality is far too stringent. Generally, Post-modern thinkers hold that
something that personal experience is sufficient for a belief in something. This is addressed
earlier and is clearly false. There is a further question to ponder though. Mitigated skepticism
when it moves to positive beliefs pre-supposes the science of our day is actually testing the
“reality” with a capital R. How do we know that there will not be paradigm shift tomorrow that
makes the science of our day seem quaint? The question at hand is this; does the science of our
day describe reality better than it has in the past?
To drive the point home even further, a global skeptic looks at all of this and says things
like, “You use vaccines supposing that there are really these things known as microbes.” It is
possible, at least logically, that there are no microbes at all. As odd as this may seem, this is a
claim worth addressing. Firstly, “ether” and “phlogiston” like “demon” theory and various other
explanations of the past simply failed to provide explanatory power for the phenomenon they
purported to describe. Demon theory, for example, could account for why seizures occur, but
failed to give a testable explanation as to why demons inhabit some and not others.
Moreover, the physics of our day is able to examine the composition of bodies and
molecules in ways never imagined before. Rather than providing supernatural explanations for
the seizure the little boy had. We can now speak of neurons, and electrical activity occurring
over certain hemispheres of the brain. These work because they have explanatory power. The
materialist paradigm, the idea that we can have naturalistic explanations for most if not all
phenomenon has been maintained because it has explanatory power.
The claim of microbes our skeptical friend levied fails because it fails to account for the
fact that microbes have explanatory power and, moreover, microbes are observable. Our

skeptical friend now has a further retort though. He can now counter with the claim of “What
makes you so sure that your senses are reliable enough to give you justification for something
like a microbe.” This will require a brief detour into the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and his
posthumously published On Certainty.
Wittgenstein takes up GE Moore’s “Hand” argument which tries to establish the validity
of the external world by appealing to common sense propositions. Wittgenstein writes in support
of Moore’s view, “For it is not true that a mistake merely gets more and more improbable as we
pass from the planet to my own hand. No: at some point it has ceased to be conceivable”
(Wittgenstein 248). Wittgenstein’s point is that to doubt some claims would devolve into
nonsense.
This is because the statement “Here is a hand” is meaningless without a hand to relate it
to. For Wittgenstein, extreme sorts of skepticism undermine rationality itself. Without
rationality, the very basis for doubting something falls apart and we thus devolve into nonsense.
Wittgenstein thought that skepticism sought to undermine language, but without language (A
tool to express doubt) you undermine the concept of doubt itself.
For the view of the mitigated skeptic there is an assumption inherent in every experiment.
The world today is the same as it was yesterday. Our organs feed us data that is somewhat
reliable. Without these assumptions nothing works. Most will find that the science of our day
works pretty well and it gets better as the years pass. That’s because it is inherently skeptical and
allows for peer review and even paradigm shifts if the evidence supports it.
5. Avoiding Conspiracy
The most extreme form of skepticism is what I refer to as denialism. This sort of
skepticism often is closely aligned with conspiracy mongers like Alex Jones or an Art Bell. The

view can be summed up this way. Contrary to ever mounting evidence, denialists hide behind
skepticism and refuse to change their position. Alex Wakefield provides our case in the paper,
but this is true of a variety of other claims.
Moreover, the denialist, rather than argue on grounds of logic and evidence, would rather
ad-hominem attack and question the motives of the opposing side. Here is where the conflation
of science and politics comes into play and we can actually see this now as a litmus test has
slowly developed on the issue of climate change. The Republican candidate to get through a
primary must deny the reality of man-made climate change. Moreover, often the argument that
denies climate science focuses on the supposed outcomes of a position. For example, a climate
denialist is often more concerned about the carbon taxes that would likely result from the
acceptance of man-made global warming. There is a huge fallacy in logic here, as the denialist is
looking at the consequences rather than the position itself.
Arguing based on the consequences does not actually address the issue itself. Arguing
that carbon taxes would hurt the economy does not address whether or not global warming is true
or not, it sidesteps the claim. Someone who takes this tact in an argument just argues backward
and says why the conclusion is undesirable. It is not immediately apparent though that an
undesirable conclusion is wrong.
Denialism should be disavowed, not because it is not skeptical. It is skepticism of an
extreme sort. The problem is the denialist leaves out the critical thinking part of the equation.
Without that, we cannot come to figure out what is true from what is false. A necessary condition
of critical thinking is that one look at both viewpoints and come to a conclusion based on the best
evidence available at the time.

Take someone that is critical of evolutionary theory. It is fair to state that evolution
cannot give us a complete picture of the origin of species as long as complete means unable to
confirm every fine grained detail of the theory. So, skepticism may be appropriate, even though
evolution presents an account that has more than enough justification to believe.
The unfair denial of evolutionary theory comes when someone refuses to believe the
theory because it conflicts with their preconceived notions about the nature of reality. For
example, someone who believes in the Garden of Eden account of creation will often doubt
evolution on those grounds alone. The argument essentiality is:
1) Evolution and the Garden of Eden account can’t both be true
2) The Garden of Eden story being true is necessary for other beliefs that I have.
3) Therefore, Evolution is false
The denialist then proceeds to ignore every piece of evidence that evolution presents
because of their preconceived notion of creation. This follows for flat-earthers, 9/11 truthers,
homeopaths and the like who all will ignore opposing evidence that conflicts with their view. To
borrow from the logic of a conspiracy theorist: “Any evidence against the conspiracy is part of
the conspiracy.” This is not skepticism, but rather doubt for the sake of it. Even worse, doubt to
hold up another belief that is probably unjustified.
VIII.

Concluding Remarks

Mitigated skepticism in short is the view that we should begin with doubt and mold our
beliefs based on the available evidence. A Cartesian gold standard of knowledge likely is not
possible, but we can have plenty of conjectural beliefs that are based on good reasons. The
reality of Climate change, evolutionary theory, and the efficacy of vaccines are all things that a
reasonable person can and should believe.

I argue throughout that global and Denialist views of knowledge go too far in their assertions.
These assertions may be valid, but I along with Hume think that these beliefs could never inform
actions. A belief that you cannot act on is useless and without content. Mitigated skepticism
argues throughout that what matters is the evidence. Science seems to work pretty well in
explaining the world around us, so there are some things we can conjecturally come to know.
However, there are a lot of things where a tincture of skepticism is not only necessary but
required. Conspiracies and odd beliefs abound and it is the job of a rational person to investigate
these claims and disavow them if there are not any good reasons to hold them. There are few
more things important than this. Untold harm is told by people who believe things for no good
reason, it is the job of the skeptic to exorcise these viewpoints.
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